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Did We Overestimate the Role of Social Preferences? 
The Case of Self-Selected Student Samples
* 
 
Social preference research has received considerable attention among economists in recent 
years. However, the empirical foundation of social preferences is largely based on laboratory 
experiments with self-selected students as participants. This is potentially problematic as 
students participating in experiments may behave systematically different than non-
participating students or non-students. In this paper we empirically investigate whether 
laboratory experiments with student samples misrepresent the importance of social 
preferences. Our first study shows that students who exhibit stronger prosocial inclinations in 
an unrelated field donation are not more likely to participate in experiments. This suggests 
that self-selection of more prosocial students into experiments is not a major issue. Our 
second study compares behavior of students and the general population in a trust 
experiment. We find very similar behavioral patterns for the two groups. If anything, the level 
of reciprocation seems higher among non-students suggesting that results from student 
samples might be seen as a lower bound for the importance of prosocial behavior. 
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Social preferences such as concerns for distributional fairness and reciprocity have re-
ceived considerable attention in recent economic research. In fact, in terms of citations
and impact, social preference research is among the leading research programs in be-
havioral economics and has inuenced the way many economists think about important
economic and social phenomena (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Cooper and Kagel, forthcom-
ing).1 A growing game theoretical literature has conceptualized the notion of fairness
and social preferences in terms of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000), fairness intention (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger,
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), in addition to motives of reputation and image
concerns (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Seabright, 2009; see also Sobel, 2005). These
models are helpful to understand the interaction of social preferences and economic
incentives and have been applied to important economic questions such as contract
theory (Fehr et al., 2007; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010), the role of fairness in the
process of institution formation (Kosfeld et al., 2009), or the analysis of bargaining
outcomes (Goeree and Holt, 2000).
Given their potentially far reaching implications in terms of economic predictions
and policy recommendations, it is important to realize that the empirical foundation of
social preferences is largely based on laboratory experiments with self-selected students
as samples. A simple counting exercise reveals that in ve eld journals, which have
persistently published lab experimental papers on social preferences, the vast majority
of all subject pools consist of self-selected students. For the years 2004 to 2009 the
1Examples comprise tax policies and public economics in general (Bowles and Hwang, 2008; Ackert
et al., 2009; Tyran and Sausgruber, 2006), contract enforcement (Fehr et al., 1993), wage formation
and relational contracting (Brown et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2006), public goods provision (Andreoni,
1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Masclet and Villeval, 2008), or organizational economics (MacLeod and
Malcomson, 1998; MacLeod, 2007; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Fehr et al., forthcoming).
2overall percentage of lab papers on social preferences using student samples, including
papers on reciprocity, fairness, altruism, envy and inequity aversion, is 89 percent.2
We report data only for these ve journals but the general statement applies to stud-
ies in other journals as well. In other words our knowledge concerning the nature of
social preferences is almost exclusively based on self-selected student samples. This is
a potential problem, because students participating in experiments might behave sys-
tematically dierent than non participating students or non-students. Student samples
are obviously not representative of the general population. For example, they dier
systematically from non-student populations in terms of social background, age or cog-
nitive skills. Do they dier with respect to social preferences as well? If participating
students behave more prosocially, we may have overestimated the potential of social
preferences for the analysis of economic outcomes. In this case we should be more
careful in plugging behavioral assumptions based on a very specic sample into models
that derive implications for the general population.
In this paper we provide empirical evidence to test whether laboratory experiments
with student samples lead to a systematic overestimation of the importance of so-
cial preferences. In particular we address two potential problems: First, experiments
rely on volunteers, creating a problem of self-selection. This may bias outcomes in
experiments if people who self-select into experimental studies are more prosocially
inclined than people who do not participate in experiments. Second, most laboratory
experiments are conducted with university undergraduates. While using students as
subjects is very convenient, they are not representative of the general population. This
is problematic if social preferences like trust and reciprocity are more prevalent among
2The journals and the respective percentages of studies that include student samples (for the
years 2004 to 2009) are Games and Economic Behavior (83 percent), Journal of Public Economics
(80 percent), Economic Journal (86 percent), Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (100
percent), Experimental Economics (79 percent), total (85 percent), own calculations. Depending on
classication (e.g., with regard to the denition of social preferences) these numbers vary and should
therefore be taken for illustrative purposes only.
3students than non-students. In a rst study we therefore analyze whether participat-
ing students are more prosocial than non-participating students. The ideal data set to
test for potential dierences between participants and non-participants would provide
information on prosocial preferences of all students while observing who participates
in experiments and who does not. This type of data is usually not available simply
because we know preferences typically only for participants in experiments. Moreover,
if we know preferences from non-experimental data, e.g., survey studies, we do not
observe decisions to participate in an experiment. In our rst study we present results
using a novel data set that combines preference measures for both participants and
non-participants. In particular we use a naturally occurring donation decision as a
measure of participants' and non-participants' prosocial inclination. Our results show
that with respect to their prosocial inclination, students who participate in laboratory
experiments are not signicantly dierent from non-participating students. These nd-
ings resonate with recent results of a study by Cleave et al. (2010) who make use of a
classroom experiment to study selection into experiments and also fail to nd a bias
regarding social preferences.
Our second study compares behavior of students and the general population. While
social preferences of non-student subject pools have been measured before (see, e.g.,
Naef et al., 2008; Bellemare et al., 2008; Fehr and List, 2004), we are not aware of a
study that provides a ceteris-paribus comparison between participants recruited out of
a typical student pool and participants recruited out of a representative sample of the
general population. Existing studies do either not use the same experimental proce-
dures for the two groups or they do not recruit the non-students out of a representative
sample.3 In our study we use the same recruitment procedure, the same instructions,
3For example, in Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) non-students participate at home, while students
come to the lab for the experiment. This dierence in the decision environment might explain part of
the dierence between the two subject pools. The same argument applies to Carpenter et al. (2008)
where students participate online and non-students mainly in a paper survey and List (2006) where
4the same decision process and the same nancial incentives for both our subject pools.
We measure social preferences with the help of a variant of the trust game, one of
the most important experimental paradigms to measure social preferences (Berg et al.,
1995). We then compare rst and second mover decisions in students with decisions
of participants recruited from a sample of the general population. Our results show
that rst movers exhibit a very similar behavioral pattern. There is no signicant
dierence in trusting behavior between students and non-students. In terms of recip-
rocation (second movers), higher investments are reciprocated with higher repayments
in both groups. However, the level of reciprocation is signicantly lower for students
than for non-students. Thus if anything the level of reciprocation seems higher among
non-students implying an even greater importance of reciprocity than assumed from
student samples.
Our paper contributes to a recent methodological debate about the role of exper-
imental economics in the social sciences (see, e.g., Levitt and List, 2007; Benz and
Meier, 2008; Falk and Heckman, 2009; List, 2009; Croson and Gaechter, 2010; Bard-
sley et al., 2010; Henrich et al., 2010; Gaechter, 2010). Some of this work has raised
serious concerns about the relevance of lab ndings with regard to the role of social
preferences. In particular, in addition to potential distortions caused by self-selected
student samples, researchers have also expressed concerns that low nancial stakes,
short durations, and high degrees of scrutiny may bias the results of lab experiments.
We think that this debate is useful. We also believe that most issues can - and actually
should be - investigated empirically, calling for more not less experiments. This paper
provides a step in this direction. Our results suggest that using self-selected student
samples does not contribute to a systematic overestimation of the importance of so-
cial preferences. Of course, our results do not exclude that laboratory experiments
sports card dealers participate in experiments at a trade show, while students interact in the lab.
5overestimate the role of social preferences for other reasons. We see our paper as a
starting point and hope that future research will also carefully investigate the empirical
relevance of other potential sources for biases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports design and results
of the eld study on selection of students into experiments. The question whether
students and non-students have dierent prosocial inclinations is discussed in section
3. Both sections discuss the research design rst and than summarize the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Study 1: Do Prosocial Students Select into Ex-
periments?
2.1 Research Design
This section analyzes whether there is a tendency for prosocially inclined undergraduate
students to self-select into laboratory experiments. We study decisions of students to
participate in experiments organized by the experimental economics laboratory of the
University of Zurich. Our sample consists of 16,666 undergraduates who registered at
the University of Zurich between the winter term 1998 and the summer term 2004 and
for whom registration at the University of Zurich is the rst enrollment at a University.
For all those students, we know whether they participated at least once in an economics
experiment. In total 1,783 students participated at least once, i.e., the participation
rate is about 11 percent.
To measure the extent of all students' prosocial inclinations we use a naturally
occurring prosocial decision at the University of Zurich as a proxy. Each semester,
6every student who renews his university enrollment has to decide whether he or she
wants to contribute a given amount (up to CHF 12; CHF 1  USD 0.95) to two social
funds which provide charitable services (nancial support for foreign students (CHF
5) and free loans for needy students (CHF 7), for further details, see Frey and Meier,
2004a,b). The level of possible donations (CHF 0 to CHF 12) is thus very similar to
stake sizes typically used in lab settings.
We believe that these donation decisions provide us with a good proxy for mea-
suring prosocial inclinations. First, our measure does not rely on self-reported survey
responses but on actual decisions. Second, donation decisions are made in private and
never made public.4 Third, students are unaware that their behavior is analyzed in
a research study. Fourth, Benz and Meier (2008) show that students who decide to
contribute money to the two funds contribute substantially more of their endowment
in a modied dictator game in the lab than students who don't contribute to the two
funds. Fifth, and most importantly, all students at the university have to decide about
contributions to the charitable funds. This means that our measure is not subject to
any selection issue.
We construct two measures of prosocial behavior based on donation decisions. Our
rst measure considers only the very rst donation decision of a student, i.e., the do-
nation decision right before the rst semester starts. This has the advantage that we
measure prosocial inclinations before students have taken any courses at the Univer-
sity, before they have been exposed to any lab recruitment eorts and before they have
participated in any experiment. We can therefore rule out the possibility of reversed
causality as participation in experiments cannot have inuenced the decision to con-
tribute to the funds. We construct a dummy variable Contributed in rst decision
4Students make their donation decision directly on the enrollment form which is sent to their homes
a couple of weeks before the semester begins.
7(=1), which is 1 if a student contributed to at least one of the two funds in his or
her rst donation decision, and 0 otherwise. It turns out that about 75 percent of
the students contribute to at least one fund in their rst decision. The second mea-
sure exploits information on all decisions taken by students. For each individual, we
calculate how often she or he contributes to at least one of the funds, relative to the
total number of decisions. The variable, Individual contribution rate, varies between 0
(never contributed to at least one fund) to 1 (contributed in all possible decisions to
at least one fund). The mean is 0.76, indicating that students, on average, contribute
in 76 percent of the decisions to at least one of the funds.5
2.2 Results
Panel A in Table 1 reveals that participants dier in various dimensions from non-
participants. For example, participants are younger when registering, more likely to
study law or medicine and less likely to study arts. These dierences indicate the
relevance of self-selection of particular groups of students. In Panel B of Table 1 we
investigate whether this selection is driven by dierences in prosocial inclinations. The
panel provides descriptive statistics of contributions to the two funds for participants
and non-participants. The summary statistic does not show any signicant dierence
in prosocial behavior between participants and non-participants. In their rst decision,
the same proportion of participants and of non-participants contributed to at least one
of the two funds (75 percent). When we look at all possible decisions of a student,
it turns out that participants contribute on average in 77 percent of all possible de-
cisions, while non-participants' contribution rate is 76 percent. This dierence is not
statistically signicant.
5The two measures are positively correlated (Spearman's Rho= 0.71, p < 0:001).
8[Table 1 about here]
The fact that individual contribution rates are very similar is also apparent when
comparing the distribution of contribution rates (see Figure 1). This gure displays
a strikingly similar distribution of donation rates between the two samples. A non-
parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis that the sam-
ples are drawn from the same distribution (p = 0:64). Thus, the raw data analysis
does not reveal any signicant dierence in prosocial inclinations of participants and
non-participants.
[Figure 1 about here]
Table 2 reports Probit estimations, where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable for the decision to participate in experiments and the independent variable is
either our rst measure of prosocial inclination (columns (1) and (2)) or our second
measure (columns (3) and (4)). We report marginal eects in brackets. Column (1)
shows that students who contribute to at least one of the funds in their rst deci-
sion are not signicantly more likely to participate in an experiment in the following
semesters than those who don't. The marginal eect is positive but small. An indi-
vidual who contributed in his or her rst semester is only 0.1 percentage points more
likely to participate in an experiment compared to an individual who did not con-
tribute. Column (2) controls for potential cohort eects. Including cohort dummies
does not substantially aect the result.
[Table 2 about here]
Columns (3) and (4) report regressions using the Individual contribution rate as a
proxy for prosocial inclinations. This proxy is potentially inuenced by students' expe-
rience at the University including their participation in experimental studies. Whether
9we include cohort dummies or not (columns (3) and (4)), the results are very similar to
the ones obtained from using only the rst decision: Individuals who contribute more
often to at least one of the two charitable funds are not signicantly more likely to
participate in experiments. The marginal eects indicate that the participation rate of
students who contribute in all possible cases (contribution rate = 1) is about 1 percent-
age point higher than the participation rate of students who never contributed to the
two funds (contribution rate = 0). This means that for an increase in the contribution
rate of one standard deviation (s.d.=0.34), the participation rate increases by only 0.3
percentage points. In sum, our results do not support the hypothesis that students
with stronger prosocial inclinations self-select into economic experiments.
3 Study 2: Do Students Behave More Prosocially?
3.1 Research Design
In the previous section we presented data indicating that students who behave more
prosocially in a natural setup are not more likely to participate in experiments than
other students. This suggests that within the group of students the bias due to self-
selection on social preferences is likely to be small. However, it is still possible that
students in general tend to behave dierently than other groups of the population.
Compared to the general population students are dierent, e.g., with respect to their
age, socioeconomic, educational and cultural background, which might correlate with
the extent of prosocial behavior. For example, dierent age cohorts have been shown
to exhibit dierent tendencies of prosocial behavior (e.g., Sutter and Kocher, 2007;
Gaechter and Herrmann, 2010). If students have dierent moral codes and social
norms, their behavior in the laboratory may not be a good indicator for other people's
10behavior outside the laboratory.
To test whether students behave more prosocially than non-students, we conduct
identical trust experiments using two distinct subject pools. Thus we only vary the
subject pool and no details of the decision context. Therefore dierences in prosocial
behavior can only be caused by dierences between the two subject pools. All partici-
pants in the experiments live in Zurich. However, while one group of our participants
was recruited from the student pool at the University of Zurich, the other group was
recruited from a representative sample of the population of the city of Zurich. To
recruit the students the university administration provided us with a random sample
of 1000 addresses of undergraduate students of the University of Zurich, i.e., the same
subject pool that the experimental economics laboratory of the University of Zurich
typically uses to conduct experiments. For the recruitment of the participants from
the general population the Statistical Oce of the City of Zurich provided us with a
sample of 4000 addresses of citizens. The procedure with which the sample was drawn
ensures that it is representative for the city population with respect to gender, age and
foreigner status.
To measure social preferences, we use a variant of the trust game, a simple sequential
two-person game introduced by Berg et al. (1995). At the beginning both subjects
receive an endowment of CHF 20. The rst mover then decides how much of his
endowment to transfer to the second mover. The transfer can be any amount in steps
of 2 CHF, i.e., 0, 2, 4, ..., or 20 CHF. The chosen transfer is tripled by the experimenter
and passed to the second mover. Contingent upon the rst mover's transfer the second
mover decides on a back transfer to the rst mover. This back transfer can be any
integer amount between 0 and 80 CHF. Incomes are determined as follows: the rst
mover earns his endowment minus his own transfer plus the back transfer of the second
mover. The second mover gets his endowment plus three times the rst mover's transfer
11minus the back transfer.
In addition, rst movers were asked to indicate their expectation about the back
transfer of their second mover given their own transfer decision. A measure of partici-
pants' beliefs allows us to distinguish between dierent motivations behind rst mover
transfers and whether these motives vary across subject pools. We can identify, e.g.,
whether high investments are made in the expectation of high back transfers or simply
reect a desire to be altruistic.
In order to elicit second movers' willingness to reciprocate, we used the contingent
response method. This means that each second mover, before knowing the actual
rst mover's investment, made a back transfer decision for each of the 11 possible
investments (0, 2, ..., 20) of the rst mover. The advantage of the contingent response
method is that it allows us to measure each second mover's willingness to reciprocate
independently from the transfer which he actually received. This is important, because
it enables us to make a clean comparison of the level of reciprocity, even if rst movers
behave dierently between subject pools. For example, if students would transfer less
than non-students, back transfers of students would be lower, even if their reciprocal
inclination was the same (or even more pronounced).
For logistical reasons the experiment was conducted via mail correspondence. All
potential participants received a mailing including a cover letter, detailed instructions,
a decision sheet and a questionnaire. The cover letter informed subjects about the pos-
sibility to take part in a paid experiment, conducted by the University of Zurich.6 Sub-
jects returned the completed decision sheets and questionnaires to the experimenters,
using a pre-stamped envelope. The instructions explained the rules and procedures of
the experiment in detail. There was no dierence in the instructions for students and
6In order to enhance the credibility that we would actually pay subjects we added the remark that
the Legal Service of the University guarantees that the study is run exactly according to the rules
stated in the instructions.
12non-students. Both groups of participants were told that they were randomly matched
with another anonymous person who lives in Zurich. The subjects had to complete the
questionnaire and the decision sheet. First movers made their transfer decision7 and
second movers lled out a contingent response table for the back transfers. We also
made clear to subjects that the study was run in accordance with the data protection
legislation of the city of Zurich. In particular, we stated that all data will be used only
for scientic purposes and not given to any third parties. Moreover, we guaranteed
that data would be stored in anonymous form and that any information specic to
persons would be destroyed immediately after the data collection was completed.
The questionnaire contained items on socioeconomic characteristics and individ-
ual attributes like gender, age, marital status, profession, nationality and number of
siblings, questions about the social environment of the participants, their political ori-
entation, and items on their social network such as how many phone calls they had
made during the last week, their number of friends in the residential neighborhood
and the number of their club memberships. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for
these variables for students and non-students. Not surprisingly, the table reveals that
students and non-students dier signicantly in many dimensions. Non-students are
on average older, are more likely to be married, have a lower education, have more
friends in their neighborhood and are more likely to be right-wingers. In addition, the
table indicates that the fraction of female participants is higher in the student sample
than in the non-student sample.
[Table 3 about here.]
7First movers could condition their transfer decision on the 12 residential district of their second
mover. Whether and how non-student rst movers discriminate between people who live in dierent
districts of Zurich is investigated in detail in Falk and Zehnder (2010). In this paper we consciously
abstract from this feature of our experiment. In the following all calculations are based on the average
transfer of a rst mover across all possible residential districts of second movers.
13Table 3 also reveals that the response rate of students was somewhat higher than
the response rate of the more general subject pool. Roughly 300 of the 1000 contacted
students took part in the study (30 percent), while about 1000 of the 4000 contacted
citizens of the City participated (25 percent). For each subject pool separately, we
randomly formed pairs among all participants who had sent back the completed de-
cisions sheets.8 Using the transfer decision of the rst mover we then checked the
corresponding back transfer of the second mover and calculated the prots of the rst
mover and the second mover. In a second mailing all participants were informed about
the outcome of the experiment, i.e., the investment and back transfer decisions and
the resulting payos for both players. The second mailing also contained the cash
payments in a sealed envelope.
3.2 Results
We rst examine trusting behavior of rst movers. Transfer decisions of rst movers are
only slightly dierent in the two subject pools. Non-students transfer on average 13.17
CHF to their second mover, while students transfer 13.47 CHF. In column (1) of Table 4
we investigate whether the observed dierence of 0.30 CHF is statistically signicant.
For this purpose we regress the rst mover decisions on a student dummy, which is
one if the decision comes from a student and zero otherwise. The regression analysis
reveals that the dierence is not statistically signicant (p = 0.63).9 However, even if
rst mover transfers do not dier between subject pools, it is possible that students
and non-students have dierent motives for their decisions. In column 2 of Table 4 we
8As there were a few more rst movers than second movers, some second movers were matched
twice. The payo of these players was determined by the decisions associated with the rst match.
9First movers can only choose transfers between 0 and 20. 224 out of the 652 have chosen the
highest possible level of 20. To account for censoring, we also estimate a Tobit regression of rst
mover decisions on the student dummy. The results conrm that there is no statistically signicant
dierence between students and non-students regarding rst mover transfers (p = 0.66).
14therefore regress rst movers' back transfer expectation on the student dummy and the
level of the transfer. The fact that the student dummy is not statistically signicant
indicates that the decisions of students and non-students are not driven by dierent
beliefs about the behavior of second movers. Thus, our results suggest that neither
beliefs about the trustworthiness and reciprocity of their fellow citizens nor transfer
decisions in the experiment dier between students and non-students.
[Table 4 about here.]
We now turn to second movers' behavior, which informs us about reciprocal incli-
nations. In Table 5 we show average second mover back transfers conditional on rst
mover transfer. For every possible rst mover transfer students make lower average
repayments than non-students. All dierences are statistically signicant (see Table 5
for the corresponding p-values). Averaging over all backtransfers, students transfer
back 15 percent less than non-students.
[Table 5 about here.]
The fact that students transfer back less than non-students does not imply that
they generally react less sensitive to rst movers' transfers. In fact Figure 2 illus-
trates that the slope between rst mover transfer and second mover back transfer is
very similar. Put dierently, students' and non-students' reciprocation pattern is very
similar; the only dierence being that students reciprocate on a lower absolute level.
Results in column (3) in Table 4 conrm this. It shows an OLS regression with sec-
ond mover's back transfer as the dependent variable. We regress back transfers on
a student dummy, the rst mover transfer and the interaction eect between student
dummy and rst mover transfer. The coecient of the student dummy is negative and
signicant, i.e., students transfer back signicantly less than non-students. However,
15the interaction eect is close to zero indicating that students and non-students exhibit
a similar reciprocal inclination as suggested by Figure 2. All results are robust if we
use Tobit estimates to account for censoring.
[Figure 2 about here.]
4 Concluding remarks
This paper empirically tests whether laboratory experiments with students system-
atically misrepresent the importance of social preferences. Such an empirical test is
critical as experimental methods become increasingly important in economics and ex-
perimental results, especially those on social preferences, often challenge traditional
views and policy implications. The convention to mainly use students might aect the
validity of laboratory experiments in two important ways: among the student popula-
tion the more prosocial individuals may volunteer to participate and students' prosocial
inclination may be more pronounced than that of the general population.
The results of our two studies show that, rst, students who exhibit more prosocial
behavior in an unrelated eld donation are not more likely to participate in experi-
ments. This suggests that there is no signicant bias due to self-selection of excessively
prosocial students into experiments. Second, student participants and non-student sub-
jects show very similar behavioral patterns in our trust experiment. Although students
make signicantly lower second mover repayments, they exhibit a similar investment
behavior and hold similar beliefs about second mover behavior as participants recruited
from the general population. In addition, we nd that students and non-students ex-
hibit a similar reciprocal inclination: the increase in repayments in response to higher
rst mover investments is very similar between subjects pools. The results of our sec-
16ond study resonate with earlier evidence suggesting that other subject pools tend to
exhibit even more prosocial behavior than students (see e.g., Fehr and List, 2004; Egas
and Riedl, 2008; Dohmen et al., 2008; Burks et al., 2009; Belot et al., 2010). Together,
our two studies suggest that relying on self-selected students samples does not sys-
tematically overestimate the importance of social preferences. However, we think it is
important that future studies also investigate the empirical relevance of other aspects
of lab studies that might favor prosocial behavior (e.g., high degrees of scrutiny, short
durations, or the salience of payo comparisons).
It would be interesting to also learn more about selection patterns of non-student
samples. In our second study we analyze prosocial behavior of two samples that volun-
teered to participate in the experiment. In light of our rst study it seems plausible to
assume the absence of important selection eects with respect to social preferences even
for non-student samples, but we cannot rule out such a possibility with our data. Even
if sorting takes place among non-students, however, our results suggest that whenever
research is based on volunteers, recruiting subjects from the general population does
not lead to dramatically dierent results than recruiting from a student subject pool. In
particular, results obtained from student samples are not systematically biased towards
overestimating the prevalence of prosocial inclinations.
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23Figure 2: Back transfers of Students and Non-Students in Study 2
 
24Table 1: Summary Statistics of Study 1
Non-participants Participants t-test/
Variable Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 2-test1
Panel A: Observable characteristics
Age at registration 21.94 4.21 21.07 2.87 p < 0:01
No. of semesters 5.34 3.26 5.97 3.15 p < 0:01
Gender (Women=1) 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.50 p < 0:01
Nationality (Foreigner=1) 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 p < 0:05
Computer science 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.16 p = 0:21
Economics & Business 0.13 0.32 0.14 0.34 p < 0:05
Theology 0.01 0.08 0.003 0.05 p < 0:05
Law 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.42 p < 0:01
Medicine 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.38 p < 0:01
Veterinary medicine 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16 p = 0:64
Arts faculty 0.47 0.49 0.33 0.46 p < 0:01
Natural science 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.21 p < 0:01
Panel B: prosocial behavior
Contributed in rst decision (=1)2 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.43 p = 0:80
Individual contribution rate3 0.76 0.34 0.77 0.33 p = 0:20
No. of observations 14,884 1,783
Note:
1 2-tests for categorical variables and t-tests otherwise.
2 Contributed to at least one fund in the rst decision (before attending any courses).
3 Proportion of decisions (out of her total), she contributed to at least one fund.
25Table 2: Participating in Experiments Depending on Prosocial Behavior in the
Field
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Contributed in rst decision (=1) 0.008 0.011
(0.030) (0.030)
[0.001] [0.002]
Individual contribution rate 0.050 0.053
(0.038) (0.040)
[0.009] [0.010]
Cohort dummies No Yes No Yes
Constant -1.248** -1.238** -1.281** -1.269**
(0.026) (0.038) (0.032) (0.044)
No. of observations 16,666 16,666 16,666 16,666
Pseudo R squared 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008
Note:
Dependent Variable: Participating at least once in an laboratory experiment (= 1). Probit
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal eects in brackets. Cohort dummies
control for the semester/year in which students registered. Level of signicance: ** p < 0:01,



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 4: Regression Analysis of First Mover and Second Mover Behavior
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable FM Transfer FM Belief SM Back Transfer
Student 0.299 0.562 -2.297**
[0.611] [0.765] [0.483]
First Mover Transfer 1.497** 1.597**
[0.046] [0.036]
Student x FM Transfer -0.056
[0.067]
Constant 13.169** -2.620** 2.907**
[0.287] [0.422] [0.285]
# Observations 652 652 7076
R squared 0.0004 0.5856 0.488
Note:
Column (1): OLS-estimations with robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent
variable is the average transfer for each rst mover (see Footnote 7 in the text for details).
Column (2): OLS-estimations with robust standard errors in brackets. The dependent
variable is the average expected back transfer for each rst mover. Column (3): OLS-
estimations with robust standard errors clustered on individual in brackets. The dependent
variable consists of second mover repayments. As repayment decisions are elicited with the
contingent response method, we have eleven observations per second mover (one for each
possible rst mover transfer). Level of signicance: ** p < 0.01, * 0.01 < p < 0.05
28Table 5: Second Mover Back Transfers Conditional on First Mover Transfer
SM Back Transfers
FM Transfer Non-Students Students Dierence WMW-Test1
0 3.52 1.25 2.27 p < 0,01
2 6.20 3.72 2.48 p < 0,01
4 9.10 6.51 2.59 p < 0,01
6 12.27 9.59 2.68 p < 0,01
8 15.27 12.45 2.82 p < 0,01
10 18.71 16.05 2.66 p < 0,01
12 22.00 19.16 2.84 p < 0,01
14 25.29 22.10 3.20 p = 0,01
16 28.34 25.31 3.03 p = 0,02
18 31.36 28.42 2.94 p = 0,07
20 35.55 31.67 3.88 p = 0,05
Note:
1 Non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test.
29